SIERRA LEONE CRAZZY POLITICS: A CASE AWAITING JUSTICE

THE POLITICS OF FRACTIONS: The 97-Vote Dilemma: Constitutional Supremacy, Injunctions, and the Battle for Sierra Leone’s Democracy.

By Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr. 17/08/2026

1. Introduction:

Can a fraction of a human vote alter the supreme law of a nation? This is the central question driving the current constitutional crisis in Sierra Leone. Following the dramatic passage of the highly contested Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025 on 10 August 2026, the nation's political landscape has locked into a fierce procedural and legal battle.

The crisis centers on two distinct but deeply connected dilemmas. The first is a mathematical and procedural dispute: what exactly constitutes a "not less than two-thirds" majority in a 149-seat parliament, and can it be bypassed during a Third Reading using voice votes? The second is a jurisdictional battle: can the Speaker of Parliament use internal rules to shield legislative voting methods from judicial review?

This article explores the legal fiction of rounding human votes, analyses the strategic maneuvers behind the opposition walkout and the ruling party’s response. It breaks down the statutory clash between Parliamentary Privilege and Constitutional Supremacy by examining global Commonwealth precedents to project how the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone must resolve this ugly standoff and details historical Sierra Leone cases, including the 2002 APC v. Speaker of Parliament precedent, and outlines why Constitutional Supremacy must ultimately triumph over Parliamentary Privilege.

2. The Indivisibility of the Sovereign Vote (The Math Argument)

THE 2/3RD MATHEMATICAL THRESHOLD

Total Seats: 149. Exact 2/3rds Calculation: 99.333...

[99 Votes] = 66.44% ◄ FAILS ("Less than" 2/3rds) requirement.

[100 Votes] = 67.11% ◄ PASSES ("Not less than" 2/3rds) requirement.

The text of Section 108 of the 1991 Constitution mandates a threshold of “not less than two-thirds” of all Members of Parliament for a constitutional amendment. In a 149-seat house, this calculation yields an exact figure of 99.33.

While daily commerce and standard statistical methods round down decimals, .5, constitutional jurisprudence treats human votes as completely indivisible. A fraction of an MP cannot cast a ballot: The "Whole Human" Rule. However, when applied to human beings in a constitutional context, this practice fails both logically and legally. The Threshold Test: Recording 99 votes yields exactly 66.44% of the total House membership. Because 66.44% is mathematically less than the constitutional floor of 66.66% (two-thirds), a tally of 99 votes will represent a structural failure to meet the mandatory threshold.

To satisfy the minimum requirement defined as "not less than," the Safety Margin is to round up to the next full human being. Therefore, any vote tally below 100 votes fails to meet the strict legal threshold required to alter the Constitution. The 97 votes obtained by the ruling government under the Speaker's purview, following the opposition walkout, fell short of this absolute minimum.

3. The Third Reading Deception

The procedural handling of the bill exacerbated the mathematical failure. The opposition All People’s Congress (APC) engaged in the committee stage under the strict understanding that the entire process was governed by the rigorous standard of Section 108, which requires a supermajority vote at both the Second and Third Readings. Some of the clause-by-clause amendments were rooted both under sections 91(1) - procedural issues, and under section 108(2) and (3) - constitutional issues for which the strict 2/3rd majority (and referendum) requirements are required. The Speaker called the vote therein on a simple majority of 97 to 46, and that prompted the walkout.

Then, at the critical Third Reading, Speaker Segepoh Solomon Thomas shifted the goalposts. Rather than conducting a formal counted vote to prove the 100-vote threshold was met, the Speaker pushed the bill through via voice votes, declaring a result of 97 to 0. By relying on a simple majority of those left in the hall under Section 91(1) rather than a comprehensive vote of the whole house under Section 108(2)(b), the procedural sanctity of the amendment was fundamentally broken. Therefore, the bill was passed unconstitutionally.

4. The Walkout by APC MPs and the Speaker’s Gambit: Strategy or Blunder?

The dramatic exit of the APC MPs followed a lengthy monologue by the Speaker, who used his position to justify the lower voting threshold at the committee stage, raising critical questions about political and procedural strategy.

Hon. Abdul Kargbo

(Leader of the Opposition in Parliament)

Was the Opposition Walkout Prudent?

Politically, the walkout was designed to strip the session of democratic legitimacy and signal a clear constitutional protest to the public and the international community. However, procedurally, it was a high-stakes gamble.

If the APC had chosen to stay, sit in their seats, and vote "No" (or even formally abstain), their 46 votes would have brought the total recorded numbers in the room to 143 (97 ruling party + 46 opposition). Had they done this:

The Speaker’s reliance on a simple majority voice vote might have been completely disrupted, forcing a divided, counted division.
The raw data would have explicitly proven that 97 votes were cast against 46, visibly falling short of the 100-vote constitutional requirement in a fully attended house.

By walking out, the APC left an empty chamber, inadvertently allowing the ruling party to manufacture an artificial consensus of "97 present, 0 opposed," giving the Speaker then used this gap to his advantage and claimed a unanimous vote among those present, ignoring section 108 compulsory mandate.

5. The Ruling Party’s Strategy: Hiding Behind Section 94(2)

The ruling party’s strategy was highly calculated. By fast-tracking the bill through a simple majority and immediately plastering the Parliamentary Facebook Page with declarations that "THE SPEAKER'S RULING IS FINAL AND CANNOT BE CHALLENGED IN ANY COURT OF LAW," the parliamentary leadership attempted to construct a legal fortress. They relied strictly on Section 94(2), which protects Parliament's right to manage its internal rules.

THE SPEAKER'S DEFENSIVE SHIELD under Section 94(2): "Internal Economy" - Dictates daily debates; Rules on points of order; now attempts to block the courts.

EXAMINING CRACKS WHEN A CONSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLD IS BREACHED falls under Section 124: "Judicial Supremacy" - the court reviews total vote counts and strikes down invalid laws passed by Parliament.

So, Why Did the Speaker Reference the Supreme Court?

If the Speaker truly believed his ruling was final and absolute, his simultaneous decision to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for an opinion within three months appears deeply contradictory and troublesome. This conning move reveals a calculated game plan rather than genuine confusion:

Shifting Political Blame: By sending the issue to the judiciary, the Speaker temporarily deflected immediate public and political outrage from the Parliamentary podium. Creating a "Fait Accompli": It allowed the executive branch to print and gazette the bill into law immediately, changing the electoral rules for the upcoming elections while the court system slowly processed the reference.
The Ultimate Paradox: The Speaker attempted to use the Supreme Court as a legal consultant to validate his actions, while simultaneously claiming the court lacked the jurisdiction to invalidate his final authority. This, in my humble opinion, is simply a poor attempt to constrict the Supreme Court to reach a decision that might equal his preferred outcome.

6. Checkmating the "Fait Accompli": The Power of Interlocutory Injunctions

The executive branch routinely tries to beat the legal clock by rapidly signing, printing, and gazetting a disputed bill into law. (So far, President Maada Bio has not yet signed this amendment bill, which has generated a huge backlash and calls on the President not to sign it.) This hurried strategy normally creates an artificial reality—a fait accompli — forcing the courts to deal with an active Act of Parliament rather than a pending bill. However, the 1991 Constitution and established common law provide citizens with a powerful shield against these fast-moving maneuvers: the "interlocutory injunction".

Under Section 124(1) of the 1991 Constitution, any citizen or political entity has direct standing (locus standi) to file an urgent emergency application to the Supreme Court alongside their substantive lawsuit. Section 124(1) of the 1991 Constitution, any citizen has the standing to approach the Supreme Court if they believe a provision of the Constitution has been manipulated, exceeded, or broken. The APC, as a political entity, or its individual MPs, possess direct standing to sue. By naming the Government Printer, the Clerk of Parliament, and the Attorney-General, an injunction can legally freeze the bill in its tracks. This emergency brake prevents the state from publishing the bill in the official Gazette until the Supreme Court rules on the 97 vs. 100 vote tally.

The Legal Balance: Why the Courts Must Freeze the Bill

To successfully secure this injunction, applicants do not need to prove their entire case immediately. They only need to meet the standard three-part legal test applied by Sierra Leonean courts:

A Serious Question to be Tried: Proving that the 97-vote margin falls short of the 99.33 threshold easily demonstrates a major, legitimate constitutional question.
Irreparable Injury: Allowing an invalid electoral law to be gazetted causes immediate, irreversible damage. It disrupts the operations of political parties and the Electoral Commission. A late court ruling cannot easily undo this chaos if election planning is moving or has already moved forward.
The Balance of Convenience: The state suffers no permanent harm by waiting for a clear Supreme Court ruling. Conversely, the democratic fabric of the nation suffers immensely if an unconstitutional amendment is allowed to take effect.

As established by the historic decision of Appeal Court Justices Tolla Thompson, Abel Stronge, and Patricia Macaulay, the judiciary’s duty to protect the Constitution includes the absolute power to freeze rushed administrative actions that attempt to bypass judicial review.

7. The Supremacy of Section 124 over Section 94(2) (The Jurisdictional Argument)

The mathematical failure has sparked an even deeper institutional crisis. Following public backlash, statements from the Parliamentary Office claimed that the Speaker's ruling on the voting method was final and is completely immune to outside legal challenges by any court. This assertion sets up a direct confrontation between two powerful sections of the 1991 Constitution. It is a misinterpretation of the relationship between Parliamentary Privilege and Constitutional Supremacy.

The Speaker's position is governed by Section 94(2), which grants Parliament the power to regulate its "internal economy"— that means, Parliament has the exclusive right to regulate its own internal procedures,- i.e., everyday debates, scheduling, and standard points of order. The logic is that courts should not meddle in daily legislative debates, house management, or points of order. However, this internal authority cannot shield an action that breaks a mandatory constitutional requirement.

The judicial position is governed by Section 124(1), which grants the Supreme Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over the enforcement and interpretation of the Constitution. It empowers the judiciary exclusively to determine whether any act passed by Parliament exceeds its legal powers exceeds its legal powers.

When a voting threshold is missed, it ceases to be a minor procedural issue and becomes a structural violation of the supreme law. As established by the landmark 2002 APC v. Speaker precedent (decided by the authoritative bench of Justices Tolla Thompson, Abel Stronge, and Patricia Macaulay), the judiciary has a duty to intervene when Parliament violates mandatory constitutional rules. Under Sierra Leonean law, the Speaker rules the House, but the Constitution rules the Speaker. The Constitution is Supreme; Parliament is not!

8. The Hierarchy of Law: Commonwealth Precedents

When an internal parliamentary rule clashes with a mandatory constitutional threshold, global Commonwealth jurisprudence (which is persuasive) is clear: Constitutional Supremacy always wins.

THE SUPREMACY HIERARCHY

Level 1: The Constitution - (Enforced by the Supreme Court) - Overrules or approves.

Level 2: Parliament Rules - (Managed by the Speaker's Fiat).

If the Speaker makes a bad call on a standard debate amendment, his ruling is final under Section 94(2). However, if the Speaker declares a Constitutional Amendment Bill passed using 97 votes instead of the required 100, he is not just managing internal procedure. He is altering the state's supreme law.

Under Section 124, the Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to step in. It can review the vote tally and declare the passing of the bill unconstitutional and void. The Constitution is supreme; Parliament is not supreme. Courts across the Commonwealth have repeatedly ruled that the Speaker’s gavel cannot be used to bypass constitutional boundaries.

9. Sierra Leonean Precedent

The Tolla Thompson, Abel Stronge and Patricia Macaulay Bench-- Appeal Court of Sierra Leone 2002: The Supreme Court of Sierra Leone previously addressed the limits of Section 94(2). The bench firmly rejected the idea that the judiciary cannot review the actions of the Speaker. The court ruled that if Parliament breaches a mandatory provision of the Constitution, the judiciary has a duty to intervene.

APC v. Speaker (2002)

The claim that the Speaker's gavel is untouchable by the courts is directly debunked by Sierra Leone's own constitutional history. During the SLPP administration of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, with the formidable Solomon Berewa serving as Attorney General, a highly parallel crisis emerged in 2002. The APC opposition filed a historic lawsuit against the Speaker of Parliament (APC v. Speaker of Parliament, 2002), challenging internal parliamentary maneuvers and rulings that they argued circumvented constitutional rules.

In that landmark era, the state tried to hide behind the exact same shield: arguing that parliamentary privilege and the Speaker's internal authority over the House were absolute and beyond the reach of judicial intervention. The Court of Appeal forcefully shattered this defense. This historic judgment established two permanent pillars of Sierra Leonean law:

The Intervention Trigger: While the courts will not interfere in the standard, minor daily running of Parliament, they have an absolute duty to intervene the moment Parliament’s internal actions conflict with mandatory constitutional mandates.
The Subordinate Legislature: Parliament is a creature of the Constitution. Therefore, no internal rule of procedure created under Section 94(2) can be used to alter, diminish, or bypass an explicit voting threshold set by the supreme framework of the nation.

West African Precedent

Attorney General of Bendel State v. AG of the Federation (1981) - Nigeria: The Nigerian Supreme Court voided an Act of the National Assembly because Parliament failed to follow the voting procedures set by th e Constitution. The court clarified that parliamentary privilege cannot be used to hide a structural violation of supreme law.
Yeboah v. JH Mensah (1998) - Ghana: The Ghanaian Supreme Court affirmed that its enforcement powers are absolute. Internal parliamentary decisions cannot shield unconstitutional acts from judicial review.

East & Southern African Precedent

The South African Constitutional Court has similarly treated supermajority

requirements as part of the constitutional safeguards surrounding constitutional

alteration:

Speaker of the National Assembly v. De Lille (1999) - South Africa: The South African Court of Appeal delivered a landmark ruling on this issue. The court stated that Parliament is a creature of the Constitution. Therefore, all its actions and rulings are subject to constitutional review.
Also see Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
1996 [1996] ZACC 26 and Matatiele Municipality & Others v President of the
Republic of South Africa & Others (2) [2006] ZACC 12.
In Justus Kariuki Mate v. Wambora (2014) - Kenya: The Kenyan courts rejected a Speaker's claim of total immunity, ruling that judicial review is fully applicable if internal legislative processes violate constitutional rights or statutory thresholds.

Also in Kenya, the Supreme Court of Kenya considered the constitutional architecture governing constitutional amendment and emphasised the special character of the prescribed amendment requirements. See. Attorney General & 2 Others v Ndii & 79 Others [2022] KESC 8,

The Ugandan Supreme Court took a stricter action in the case of Attorney General v Ssemogerere & Olum [2005] UGSC 29, where the Court held that the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds majority of all Members of Parliament and stressed the necessity of complying with the constitutionally prescribed amendment procedure.

The United Kingdom

The Traditional Westminster Rule (Bradlaugh v. Gossett, 1884): Historically, the UK established that courts would not interfere with the internal affairs of Parliament. However, the UK operates under Parliamentary Sovereignty because it lacks a single, codified written constitution.
The Modern Shift (R v. Chaytor, 2010): Even in the UK, the Supreme Court has clarified that parliamentary privilege has limits. It does not apply to actions that fall outside the core law-making functions of the House.

Global Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, & Caribbean)

Canada (Harvey v. New Brunswick, 1996): The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that while parliamentary privilege is important, it cannot be used to bypass the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The Caribbean (Collymore v. Attorney General, 1967 - Trinidad and Tobago): This foundational case established that the courts have a duty to ensure the legislature acts within the boundaries of the constitution. Any legislative act that breaches these boundaries is void.

These Commonwealth cases are persuasive authorities that add weight to our own supreme judicial decisions and are in line with other constitutional juristic principles. They affirm that where a Constitution prescribes a special threshold for its alteration, or amendment, that

threshold must be strictly adhered to and given its full constitutional effect.

10. The Three-Step Deception

The strategy used by the ruling party and the Speaker follows a clear, calculated playbook designed to sideline the opposition and fast-track controversial electoral changes:

Step 1: The Bait-and-Switch: The opposition All People’s Congress (APC) joined the committee stage under the clear understanding that the entire process was bound by Section 108, which requires a strict two-thirds supermajority (100 votes) at both the Second and Third Readings.
Step 2: The Monologue and Walkout: Following a lengthy monologue by the Speaker to justify a lower voting threshold, the opposition walked out in protest. The Speaker immediately seized this moment. He shifted the goalposts by abandoning counted votes and relying on simple majority voice votes (97 to 0) under Section 91.
Step 3: The Facebook Dictum: Minutes later, Parliament’s official Facebook page declared that the Speaker's ruling was final and immune to court challenges under Section 94(2).

The Advisory Referral Game Plan

The Speaker’s decision to refer his own actions to the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion within three months is not a sign of confusion. It is a calculated stalling tactic.

By sending the issue to the judiciary while simultaneously claiming the courts have no power to overrule him, the Speaker attempted to pull off a legal illusion. The goal is simple: tie up the opposition in a slow-moving, three-month court process while the executive branch quickly prints, serialises, and gazettes the bill into law. By the time the court steps in, the government hopes to present the new electoral rules as an unalterable reality ahead of the 2028 elections.

11. Hitting the Emergency Brake

The APC and ordinary citizens do not have to sit idly by and watch this legal clock run out. The law provides an explicit counter-strategy to defeat these fast-moving tricks: the interlocutory injunction.

By aggressively filing for an urgent injunction against the Government Printer and the Attorney General, the opposition can completely stall the state machine. This legal action forces a freeze on the publication of the bill, rendering it completely inactive.

The historic 2002 APC v. Speaker case—decided by the authoritative bench of Justices Tolla Thompson, Abel Stronge, and Patricia Macaulay—clearly established that the Speaker's gavel cannot shield constitutional violations from judicial review.

The government's fast-moving tricks can, and should, be halted. The opposition must use the emergency brake of the courts to prove that while the Speaker may control the daily schedule of Parliament, he can never outrun the Constitution.

12. Conclusion: Final Arbiter - The Constitution is Master of Parliament.

The political narrative published on the Parliament’s Facebook Page is an outdated concept of absolute Parliamentary Sovereignty that does not exist under a written constitution.

This claim that a Speaker's ruling on a constitutional amendment is final and immune to court challenges is legally unsupported in a modern democracy, as we have seen from the cases mentioned above.

While the Speaker maintains total authority over ordinary internal House procedures, that power ends the moment a constitutional threshold is breached. He does not possess the power to rewrite mathematics. Lowering a mandatory supermajority from 100 votes to 97 votes through an alternative interpretation of the quorum is not only a minor procedural choice - it is a structural alteration of the state's supreme framework.

In a system based on constitutional supremacy, Section 124 overrides Section 94(2) when a constitutional threshold is violated. The Speaker rules over parliamentary procedure as stated above, but the Supreme Court rules over the Constitution. As established by the 2002 APC v. Speaker precedent, the judiciary holds the ultimate map of power. The Supreme Court of Sierra Leone holds the ultimate authority to resolve this crisis. Armed with Section 124, backed by solid domestic and Commonwealth precedents, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone, having been dragged into this dispute by the Speaker, must now step forward and apply the Rule of Law. Its upcoming ruling must firmly remind the legislative branch of a timeless democratic truth and reinforce its constitutional authority entrenched under section 124. PRESIDENT JULIUS MAADA BIO MUST NOT ASSENT TO THIS BILL SO IRREGULARLY PASSED, BUT MUST RETURN IT TO PARLIAMENT FOR FURTHER SCRUTINY, FOR PEACE AND PROPER ORDER

Parliament is master of its own House, but the Constitution remains master of Parliament. The Speaker rules the House, but the Constitution rules the Speaker.