Saturday, 24 October 2026

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: THE SUPREME COURT STRICKS OUT GOVERNMENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE OPPOSITION CASES CHALLENGING THE LEGALITY OF PASSING OF THE 2025 AMENDMENT BILL.

The most critical update in the Sierra Leone Constitutional Amendment crisis since October 16, 2026, is that the Government of Sierra Leone formally moved to have the consolidated legal challenges by the plaintiffs - the opposition APC and others, thrown out, while the Supreme Court banned live broadcasts of the legal proceedings. [1, 2]

The legal standoff centers on whether the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2025 was legally passed on August 10, 2026, using a simple parliamentary majority (97 votes) rather than the strict two-thirds majority typically required for constitutional alterations. [1, 2, 3].

The key developments include:

State Motion to Dismiss (Filed October 16): The Law Officers' Department submitted a formal Notice of Motion. The government argues that the Supreme Court entirely lacks jurisdiction to review internal parliamentary proceedings. They cite Section 94(2) of the 1991 Constitution, asserting that the case violates the separation of powers and is premature because the bill has not yet received presidential assent. [1, 2, 3]
Media Blackout and In-Chambers Direction Hearing (October 20): Chief Justice Komba Kamanda led an in-chambers direction hearing for the consolidated lawsuits. In a controversial move, the Supreme Court registry issued a public notice banning live media broadcasts and stating that press coverage was not required for this session. The scheduled morning hearing was also delayed and pushed to 2:00 PM that afternoon. [1, 2, 3].

Parliament Reopened Amid Gridlock (October 16): On the legislative side, lawmakers returned to the Chamber of Parliament at Tower Hill following an official recall directive from President Julius Maada Bio. While intended to handle financial and national development items, the parliamentary atmosphere remains heavily divided over the frozen bill. [1, 2]

The consolidated lawsuits brought forward by opposition figures (including the All People's Congress) and the Lawyers' Society members remain in limbo as the bench decides whether to uphold the government's application for dismissal. [1, 2, 3].

What is the position now since 20th October proceedings? Let us analyse the Ruling by the C J and its implications?

Following the closed-door proceedings on Tuesday, 20 October 2026, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone struck out the government's motion to dismiss the cases, keeping the landmark constitutional challenge alive. [1]

Chief Justice Komba Kamanda and the five-judge panel rejected the State’s early attempt to shut down the consolidated lawsuits (S.C. 8/2026, 9/2026, and 11/2026). Instead, the court restarted the legal clock and ordered all parties to move forward. [1, 2, 3].

Analysis of the Supreme Court's Ruling & Its Implications.

1. The Government's Shield was Weakened, but Not Destroyed.

The State’s application argued that the court lacked jurisdiction under Section 94(2) because the bill hadn't received presidential assent and parliament's internal voting procedures should be exempt from judicial review. By striking out this motion, the Chief Justice ruled that the court will not pre-emptively dismiss the opposition and Lawyers' Society cases without examining the core legal arguments. However, the CJ left a critical window open: the government is permitted to raise these exact jurisdiction objections again during its formal Statement of Case at the upcoming substantive hearing. [1, 2]

2. Strict Technical Deadlines were Reinstituted.

Rather than allowing the trial to stagnate, the Chief Justice restarted the clock on compliance periods, effective 20 October 2026. The Attorney-General was given a strict 24-hour window from the ruling to serve the official Reference to the plaintiffs' solicitors and the amicus curiae (friends of the court). The CJ explicitly warned that any party failing to meet these renewed timelines would face immediate default proceedings. This signals the judiciary's intent to fast-track a crisis that is paralyzing the political landscape ahead of the 2028 elections. [1, 2].

3. Political Stakes Remain Sky-High.

Because the ruling is procedural rather than substantive, the court has still not decided if the Bill was passed lawfully with 97 votes instead of the 100-vote threshold (two-thirds of the 149 MPs). With the bill proposing highly controversial reforms—such as lowering the presidential first-round victory threshold from 55% to 50% plus one—the judiciary in my view is treading carefully, effectively forcing both sides to lay bare their full constitutional text interpretations in open court. [1, 2].

Date for the Next Sitting

The Supreme Court has not yet fixed an exact public date for the next oral arguments.

Because the Chief Justice ordered the immediate restart of filing timelines starting 20 October, the next phase relies on the plaintiffs and defendants exchanging their formal Statements of Case over the next couple of weeks. Once these documents are submitted under the court's strict compliance warning, the registry will schedule the definitive substantive hearing. [1].

Let us examine the specific arguments, the Lawyers' Society members and the APC opposition party are using to counter the Speaker's simple-majority ruling, and also, consider a breakdown of how the proposed threshold changes alter the 2028 election dynamics? [1, 2]. This ongoing legal and political battle over the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2025 represents the most critical test of Sierra Leone’s democratic framework since the end of the civil war.

The legal arguments presented by the opposition and the legal community, combined with the structural impact of these changes on the 2028 elections, shape the current crisis as detailed below.

1. The Lawyers’ Society Stance: Preserving Constitutional Integrity.

The Lawyers' Society approaches the crisis from a strictly rule-of-law perspective, arguing that the government's legislative shortcuts threaten the fabric of the state's legal framework.

The Two-Thirds Safeguard: The primary legal argument is that any substantive decision regarding a constitutional alteration must strictly adhere to the two-thirds majority requirement set out in the 1991 Constitution. They argue that allowing individual clauses or committee-stage votes to be decided by a simple majority bypasses essential democratic checks and balances. [1].

Procedural Violations (The Gazette Requirement): Beyond the parliamentary vote count, legal challenges—including those supported by opposition lawmakers like Hon. Osman Timbo—allege explicit procedural failures. They argue the Bill was not legally published in two consecutive issues of the government Gazette before being introduced, which is a mandatory prerequisite for any constitutional amendment. [1].

Separation of Powers: The Lawyers’ Society strongly rejects the State’s claim that Parliament's internal affairs are completely immune to judicial review. They argue the Supreme Court has an absolute duty to intervene when Parliament acts ultra vires (beyond its legal authority) by violating the very constitution that gives it the power to legislate.

2. The All People’s Congress (APC) Stance: Opposing a "Legislative Coup".

For the main opposition party, the APC, the amendment bill is viewed as a calculated, partisan attempt by the ruling Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) to solidify power. [1]

Resistance to Simple-Majority Rule: The APC staging a walkout during the August 2026 proceedings was an effort to deny legitimacy to the bill. The party maintains that the SLPP explicitly weaponised a 97-vote simple majority to force through alterations that fundamentally require 100 votes (two-thirds of the 149-seat parliament). [1].

Electoral System Backsliding: The APC strongly opposes the shifting of boundaries and the proposed wholesale transition to a Proportional Representation (PR) system under conditions they deem illegal while court proceedings are still active. [1, 2].

Defense of Democratic Space: The APC successfully fought against a provision in the early drafts of the bill that would have entirely barred independent candidates from contesting the presidency. While they managed to strike down that specific clause, they argue the remaining un-vetted clauses represent an existential threat to multi-party democracy. [1].

3. Effect on the 2028 Election Dynamics

If the Supreme Court ultimately rules in favor of the government and allows the amendments to stand, the political landscape for the 2028 general elections will change entirely.

Proposed Amendment	Current System	Strategic Dynamic for 2028
Presidential Threshold	55% of valid votes required to win in the first round.	50% plus one vote required for a first-round victory.
Run-off Probability	High. Forces major parties to build broad national coalitions to cross 55%.	Low. The ruling SLPP can secure a first-round victory solely by consolidating its regional strongholds, bypassing the need for cross-regional consensus.
Third-Party Influence	Significant. Smaller parties act as vital "kingmakers" in an inevitable second round.	Diminished. Third parties lose their political leverage if a major party can cross the lower 50% finish line immediately.
Electoral System	Standard constituency-based voting.	Shift towards a institutionalized Proportional Representation (PR) framework.

The Core Strategic Shift

Under the current 55% rule, winning an election in Sierra Leone requires nationwide appeal and post-election coalition-building. Lowering the bar to 50% plus one fundamentally changes the math. [1].

The ruling SLPP knows that its traditional voter bases, when highly mobilized, can comfortably hover around the 50% mark. By lowering the threshold, the ruling SLPP party effectively eliminates the risk of a unpredictable second-round run-off election, where opposition forces traditionally unite against the incumbent. Conversely, the APC faces a much steeper uphill battle; they can no longer rely on forcing a run-off to gather third-party backing and must instead find a way to win an outright majority in a single round.

To fully synthesize the constitutional crisis of 2026, it is necessary to examine both its statutory origins and its historical judicial context. The following analysis merges the precedent-setting mechanics of the Public Elections Act of 2022 with the Supreme Court’s historical jurisprudence on parliamentary sovereignty, utilizing a semi-academic framework grounded in constitutional law and political ethics.

Part I: The Statutory Genesis – The Public Elections Act 2022

The road to the 2026 crisis was paved by the passage of the Public Elections Act, 2022 under Dr. Abass Bundu’s speakership. This piece of legislation serves as the ultimate case study in "de-constitutionalisation"—the practice of using ordinary statutes to reshape constitutional realities.

1. The Proportional Representation (PR) Backdoor

Section 38A of the 1991 Constitution permits the use of a Proportional Representation (District Top-Up) system, but only when the President determines that existing constituencies have not been reasonably established for an election.

Instead of waiting for such an exceptional executive determination, the Public Elections Act 2022 sought to permanently codify and institutionalize the PR framework for local and parliamentary elections. The opposition argued this structural shift altered the foundational representative character of Parliament, implicitly amending Section 38 of the Constitution. However, the parliamentary leadership ruled that because the amendment was housed within an ordinary statutory Act, it required only a simple majority to pass.

2. The Ethical Dilemma of "Substantive Circumvention"

From an ethical perspective, this technique violates the Doctrine of Constitutionalism, which dictates that a constitution must be a rigid, predictable document shielded from transient political majorities.

[Constitutional Ideal]

Constitutional Amendment ──> Requires Supermajority (2/3rd) ──> Achieves National Consensus.

[The 2022–2026 Practice]

Constitutional Substance ──> Packaged as Ordinary Act ──> Passed by Simple Majority ──> Partisan Dominance.

By hiding constitutional changes inside ordinary legislation, the ruling SLPP engaged in what legal scholars term a "fraud on the Constitution." It allowed the government to accomplish by a simple majority what the framers explicitly intended to protect with a strict two-thirds lock.

Part II: Historical Jurisprudence – The Supreme Court as Arbitrator

The 2026 consolidated lawsuits (S.C. 8/2026, 9/2026, and 11/2026) do not exist in a judicial vacuum. The current bench, led by Chief Justice Komba Kamanda, is grappling with conflicting historical precedents regarding where parliamentary independence ends and judicial review begins.

1. The Shield of Non-Intervention: The State v. Tarawallie Framework

The government’s primary defense rests on the traditional common-law doctrine of Parliamentary Privilege and Supremacy, heavily drawing from historical precedents like The State v. Tarawallie. Historically, the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone has maintained a posture of judicial restraint regarding the inner workings of the House, ruling that:

Under Section 94(2) of the 1991 Constitution, Parliament enjoys the exclusive right to regulate its own internal procedures.
The court should not peer behind the parliamentary curtain to police how votes are conducted or how bills are debated.

The State relies on this line of authority to argue that the 97-vote count is an internal matter, and that judicial intervention violates the separation of powers.

2. The Spear of Judicial Supremacy: APC v. Attorney General & Electoral Commission (2023)

Conversely, the Lawyers' Society and the APC point to more recent, activist jurisprudence, notably the legal battles leading up to the 2023 elections. In these matters, the Supreme Court clarified that parliamentary autonomy is not absolute.

The court established that while Parliament has the right to manage its own procedures, it must do so within the boundaries set by the Constitution. If Parliament violates a mandatory constitutional condition precedent—such as failing to reach a two-thirds majority under Section 108 or violating Gazette publication timelines—the internal procedure is no longer protected by privilege. It becomes an unconstitutional act, rendering it void ab initio (from the beginning).

Part III: Synthesis of Legal and Ethical Arguments

The intersection of the Public Elections Act 2022 and historical judicial precedents highlights a profound tension between formal legality and democratic legitimacy.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CROSSROADS (2026)

THE STATE'S POSITION

Formal Legality

Simple Majority (97 Votes) Suffices

Protected Parliamentary Procedure

THEPLAINTIFFS' POSITION

Substantive Constitutionalism

Absolute 2/3 Guardrail (100 Votes)

Judicial Review of Overreach.

1. The Legal Crux: Procedure vs. Substance

The legal crisis hinges on a single question: Is a vote count a matter of procedure or a matter of substance?

The State argues that how a vote is tallied and declared by the Speaker is a procedural rule of the House, immune to outside interference.
The Plaintiffs argue that the two-thirds threshold is a substantive constitutional guardrail. Lowering it down to 97 votes transforms Sierra Leone from a constitutional democracy into a system of absolute parliamentary majoritarianism, effectively giving any sitting government the power to rewrite the rules of state governance at will.

2. The Ethical Failure: Reciprocity and the Rule of Law

Ethically, the current crisis represents a breakdown of institutional trust. In political philosophy, the legitimacy of the rule of law relies on the Principle of Reciprocity—the understanding that a ruling party will not alter foundational rules purely to disadvantage its opponents.

By using the legal maneuvers perfected during the 2022 Public Elections Act debates to push through the 2026 amendments, the current parliamentary leadership (the Speaker), has prioritized executive expediency over democratic consensus. If the Supreme Court ultimately legitimises the 97-vote threshold, it will codify a dangerous precedent: that the Constitution is no longer a permanent contract between the state and its citizens, but a flexible tool to be reshaped by whoever holds a simple legislative majority.

To finalise this discussion, I shall examine the comparative constitutional models (such as Ghana or Kenya) that might assist the Sierra Leone's Supreme Court for guidance on this matter?.

Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr.

(Author/Blogger/Publisher)

Monday, 19 October 2026

SIERRA LEONE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE MOVES PROCEEDINGS INTO CHAMBERS

As of 19 October 2026, the constitutional dispute surrounding the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill, 2025/2026 remains unresolved, and the matter is now firmly before the Supreme Court. (Key Online Publications reporting the status of events include: sierraleonemonitor; sierraloaded;

sierraleonemonitor; premiermedia-sl.)

Key developments between 7 October and 19 October 2026

1. Supreme Court hearings began on 7 October

The Supreme Court commenced hearings into multiple legal challenges to the amendment bill, which had been passed by Parliament on 10 August 2026 amid controversy over the required voting threshold. The central question remains whether constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority of all MPs or merely a simple majority of members present and voting. [citation]

(sierraleonemonitor)

2. Court dismissed an early procedural objection

On 7 October, the Court rejected a procedural challenge brought by APC lawyers against an application by the Speaker of Parliament and the Attorney-General to consolidate several related constitutional cases. The Court allowed the consolidation application to proceed. Importantly, it did not rule on the constitutional merits at that stage. [citation]

(sierraloaded)

3. Dramatic clash between the Chief Justice and APC counsel JFK

On 8 October, proceedings became highly contentious when lawyer Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara (JFK), representing APC interests, clashed with Chief Justice Komba Kamanda. The Chief Justice held that Kamara's apology to the Court was inadequate, ordered him to remove his wig and enter the dock, and contempt proceedings followed. The incident generated significant political and legal discussion nationwide. [citation]

(sierraleonemonitor)

4. Cases were consolidated

By mid-October, the Court was dealing with three consolidated constitutional actions challenging the passage of the amendment bill. The consolidated proceedings involve challenges from APC figures, individual MPs and civil society actors. The Institute for Legal Research and Advocacy for Justice (ILRAJ) was also admitted as an amicus curiae (friend of the court). [citation]

(sierraleonemonitor)

5. Main constitutional issue remains the "100 votes" question

The challengers argue that Section 108 requires support from two-thirds of all MPs, which would amount to about 100 votes in the 149-member Parliament. They contend that Parliament recorded approximately 96-97 affirmative votes, which would fall short of the constitutional threshold. [citation]

(sierraleonemonitor)

6. Government filed a major preliminary objection (16-19 October)

The most significant recent development is that the Government has asked the Supreme Court to strike out the entire challenge before the merits are heard. The State argues:

•Courts cannot review Parliament's internal proceedings because of constitutional protections.

•The Bill is not yet law, as presidential assent has not been granted.

•Any challenge is therefore premature.

•The courts should not interfere with the President's constitutional discretion regarding assent. [citation] (sierraleonemonitor.

The Government's application was filed on 16 October 2026 and publicly reported on 19 October 2026. The State also requested that further proceedings be paused pending determination of its preliminary objection. At the time of reporting, no hearing date had yet been fixed for that objection. [citation]

(sierraleonemonitor).

Current status as of 19 October 2026

•No final Supreme Court judgment has been delivered. [citation] (sierraleonemonitor)

•President Bio has not assented to the Bill. He previously referred constitutional questions for judicial clarification. (premiermedia-sl)

•The Court must first decide whether it has jurisdiction and whether the challenges can proceed before any substantive ruling on the voting threshold issue. The constitutional and political uncertainty therefore continues.

Bottom-line assessment

The crisis has moved from Parliament into the judiciary. Between 7 and 19 October 2026, the major developments were procedural rather than substantive: consolidation of cases, courtroom confrontations, and the Government's attempt to have the challenges dismissed. The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the decisive constitutional question of whether the amendment bill was validly passed with fewer than 100 votes. [citation]

(sierraloaded).

Futheron we shall examine and provide a constitutional-law analysis of the competing interpretations of Sections 91, 94, 108, 122 and 127, together with a likely-outcomes assessment and implications for Sierra Leone's democratic framework.

Friday, 9 October 2026

Justice on the Dock: Temperament, Recusal, and the Constitutional Crisis in Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court

Justice on the Dock: Temperament, Recusal, and the Constitutional Crisis in Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court.

By Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr. 09/10/2026

When the Constitution of a nation is on the operating table, the courtroom cannot afford to become a battleground of personalities. The constitutional crisis currently unfolding before Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court—centered on the controversial passage of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill—has tested not only the limits of legislative power, but also the delicate boundaries of judicial temperament and courtroom decorum.

Following a dramatic confrontation that saw senior counsel Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara (J.F.K.) ordered to step into the dock after accusing the Bench of "showing its hand too early," and later, remanded at Pademba Road Prison: public attention sharply shifted from the legal merits of the case to the impartiality of the court itself. At stake was a fundamental question of democratic integrity: Can a judiciary where sitting judges were appointed under the current administration deliver an unassailable verdict on the rules governing the country’s democracy?

1. The Core Legal Battle: Section 91 (1) vs. Section 108 2 (b).

The substantive debate before the Supreme Court turned on a sharp conflict over legislative procedure and voting thresholds regarding how the 1991 Constitution may be altered.

The State’s Position (Section 91(1)):

The State argues that for non-entrenched provisions of the Constitution, ordinary parliamentary rules apply. Under Section 91(1), decisions are determined by a simple majority of "Members present and voting."

In this view, when opposition members execute a parliamentary walkout, the voting threshold drops accordingly—allowing a simple majority of those remaining in the chamber to pass the amendment bill into law.

The Opposition’s Position (Section 108(2)(b):

Senior counsel and opposition advocates argue that any alteration to the supreme law of the land—whether entrenched or non-entrenched— is strictly governed by Section 108. Section 108(2)(b) explicitly mandates a two-thirds supermajority of "all Members of Parliament," not merely those present in their seats.

They contend that Section 91 is a residual clause meant for ordinary statutes and must step aside when constitutional amendments are on the floor.

2. Judicial Temperament and the Power of Contempt.

The friction in court escalated when counsel raised procedural objections regarding the State's failure to file mandatory legal papers on time. When the Chief Justice intervened in a manner that appeared to defend or excuse the Attorney General's omission, counsel remarked that the court had "showed its hand too early."

The Chief Justice admonished counsel to "mind your language; this is not a political theatre," prompting counsel to reply that he was merely citing provisions of the law and asking to be allowed to make his case. The court adjourned, only for the bench to return the following day demanding a formal apology.

Deeming the tendered apology insufficient, the Chief Justice ordered counsel to remove his wig and enter the dock before being taken down by security to Pademba Road Prison (or Male Correctional Centre).

THE DYNAMICS OF COURT DECORUM rests on two levels:

ZELOUS ADVOCACY

> Firm procedural obligation

> Challenging State non- compliance

>Protecting client’s rights.

JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS

> Patience under provocation

>Summary contempt of last resort

> Preserving public confidence

This escalation highlights critical principles of judicial administration:

Proportionality: Summary contempt is intended as a weapon of last resort to prevent actual disruption of proceedings, not to punish verbal exchanges or vindicate personal pride.

The Danger of Punitive Sanctions: Ordering a former Attorney General and senior advocate into the dock and imprisoning him after an apology (and retraction) is entered on the record, risks creating the perception that personal authority, rather than the administration of justice, is driving the court's actions.

3. Recusal Procedure in the Supreme Court.

When a litigant or counsel believes a judge cannot hear a case impartially, the law provides a formal mechanism for recusal grounded in the principles of natural justice—specifically nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause).

Grounds for Recusal.

1. Apparent Bias: Under the established common law standard (Porter v Magill), a applicant does not need to prove actual bias. The test is whether a "reasonable and fair-minded observer" would conclude there is a real possibility the judge is biased.

2. Hostility In Court (In Facie Curiae):

A heated personal clash where a judge threatens summary contempt, rejects a formal apology, orders counsel to “remove his wig and go into the dock and afterwards orders his arrest in open court, then instructs security to “take him down” to prison, creates an objective perception of animus.

3. Prejudgment & Double Standards:

Excusing or shielding a defaulting party from statutory procedural requirements gives the appearance of favoring one side before full arguments are heard.

The Procedural Steps for Recusal

1)>Notice of motion (Affidavit of apparent bias)

2)> Panel heating(Arguments on impartiality)

3)>Judicial decision (Voluntary step-down or written refusal)

4)> Reconstruction (Empanel neutral panel .

1. Notice of Motion: Counsel files a formal application supported by an affidavit detailing the specific facts, statements, and actions showing apparent bias or personal conflict.

2. Hearing Before the Panel: The application is brought directly before the presiding judge or the entire bench, where arguments on judicial impartiality are formally entered into the record.

3. Judicial Discretion or Voluntary Step-Down: The judge can either voluntarily step aside to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice or refuse the motion with written reasons.

4. Reconstitution of the Bench: If the Chief Justice recuses himself from presiding, administrative authority allows the panel to be reconstituted. A full bench of seven Supreme Court Justices can be empaneled—ideally including senior, non-conflicted jurists—to ensure the eventual ruling commands full public legitimacy.

Conclusion.

The power of the judiciary ultimately rests on public trust, not physical force. When judicial officers clash with senior advocates over procedural objections, the boundary between enforcing decorum and shielding the State becomes dangerously blurred.

For Chief Justice Komba Kamanda, stepping aside from presiding over this specific case would not be a concession of defeat, but an act of judicial restraint. In a constitutional contest where ALL FIVE sitting judge on the bench were appointed under the current administration, self-recusal offers the cleanest path to ensure that whatever verdict the Supreme Court reaches on Sections 91 and 108, it is accepted as the definitive voice of the law, rather than the political triumph of one faction over another.

-------------------------------------------------------------------

Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court Confronts a Constitutional Breakdown: Amendment Crisis - Ultra Vires Actions, Procedural Breaches, and Fate of the Amendment Bill.

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EDWnR28zF/

A Court in Crisis: How Emotional Volatility Shattered Sierra Leone’s Constitutional Decorum

https://thesaloneindependentchronicle.com/?fbclid=IwdGRjcAU56nljbGNrBTnkDmV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHBkb2YFc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQMMzUwNjg1NTMxNzI4AAEet4Dek-Yyef8Q20gpPOgypgeSqfWu_1iGNSs0cSlqQGxZOwEbdjRA1K3nkxs_aem_Vb5pu1WXRcnWRT7ph8FXuw

Constitution Under Fire: Chief Justice Explosive Temperament Turns Supreme Court Into a Battlefield of Indiscipline and Ethical Breakdown

Albert David KAMARA

October 7, 2026

https://thesaloneindependentchronicle.com/?fbclid=IwdGRjcAU55l9jbGNrBTnkDmV4dG4DYWVtAjExAHBkb2YFc3J0YwZhcHBfaWQMMzUwNjg1NTMxNzI46AAEet4Dek-Yyef8Q20gpPOgypgeSqfWu_1iGNSs0cSlqQGxZOwEbdjRA1K3nkxs_aem_Vb5pu1WXRcnWRT7ph8FXuw

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr

Author/Blogger/Publisher

Wednesday, 7 October 2026

Constitutional Safeguards, Democratic Legitimacy, and the Sierra Leone Amendment Crisis: A Unified National Analysis (2021–2026)”

By Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr (14/09/2026)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Sierra Leone’s constitutional order is confronting a structural crisis rooted in the inconsistent application of Section 108, the entrenched‑clause amendment procedure. Two events — the 2021 abolition of the death penalty and the 2025–2026 constitutional amendment dispute — expose a recurring procedural fault line: the use of ordinary legislation to alter or neutralise entrenched constitutional meaning.The 2021 Abolition Act bypassed Section 108 despite entrenched constitutional references to capital punishment. Sierra Leone later ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, strengthening abolition internationally but not curing the domestic procedural irregularity.In 2026, Parliament used the same shortcut to pass a constitutional amendment bill by simple majority under Section 91(1). Opposition MPs walked out. Four petitions have now reached the Supreme Court.

The crisis now requires judicial clarification. The Supreme Court must determine whether altering entrenched constitutional meaning requires Section 108. The ruling will define Sierra Leone’s constitutional future.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutionalism, Entrenchment, and the Crisis of Amendment Discipline. Constitutional democracies rely on procedural discipline. Entrenched clauses — requiring supermajority and referendum — exist to protect foundational rights, institutional structures, and democratic legitimacy. When these safeguards are bypassed, constitutional stability is threatened. Sierra Leone’s 2021 abolition of the death penalty was a landmark human‑rights achievement. Yet its legislative pathway raised constitutional concerns. The Constitution contains entrenched references to capital punishment, particularly in treason provisions.

Parliament abolished the death penalty through ordinary legislation, bypassing Section 108 - the 2/3rd majority and referendum requirments. The Supreme Court did not intervene - the doubt and uncertainties were not referred to the Court. This procedural ambiguity resurfaced in 2026 when Parliament passed a constitutional amendment bill on 10th August 2026, using the same simple‑majority logic. Opposition MPs walked out at the Committee stage. The 1991 constitution madated 2/3rd majority in the secobd and third readings. Thesev were not obtained. Four petitions are now filed at the Supreme Court.

This publication examines: the constitutional architecture of entrenchment, the 2021 irregularity, the 2026 crisis, the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, objectors’ views (including Sylvanus Koroma), interpretive theories, comparative jurisprudence, governance risks, and

the Supreme Court’s likely approach.

The analysis is grounded in constitutional theory (Ackerman, Dworkin, Waldron), ethical frameworks (Rawls, Kant), and comparative case law (Kenya, Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, India, Canada).

SECTION 1 — THE 2021 ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY

1.1 The Act: Parliament abolished capital punishment through ordinary legislation.

1.2 Constitutional Tension: The Constitution contains entrenched references to capital punishment.

1.3 Treaty Ratification: Sierra Leone ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, committing to permanent abolition.

1.4 Objectors’ Views — including Sylvanus Koroma (“What a Man”). Objectors including

Sylvanus Fornah Koroma argued: abolition without referendum was a constitutional kerfuffle; entrenched clauses cannot be amended by ordinary legislation; bypassing Section 108 undermines democratic legitimacy; constitutional meaning cannot be changed indirectly; the Supreme Court’s silence created instability. His critique is grounded in: literal interpretation (the Constitution references death penalty), purposive interpretation (entrenchment protects foundational rights), and constitutionalism theory (procedural legitimacy is essential).

SECTION 2 — THE 2025–2026 AMENDMENT CRISIS.

2.1 The Bill: The Amendment Bill sought to modify entrenched provisions.

2.2 The Speaker’s Ruling: The Speaker applied Section 91(1) (simple majority).

2.3 Opposition Walkout: Opposition MPs walked out, arguing Section 108 applied and will not be party to a treanous breach of tge constitution.

2.4 Treaty Implications: The Second Optional Protocol strengthens abolition of the death penalty but highlights the contradiction. Sierra Leone complied internationally while bypassing domestic entrenchment rules.

SECTION 3 — THE FOUR SUPREME CASES at the Supreme Court.

Case 1 — Osman Timbo Esq. (APC MP/ Lawyer)

Prayers: Declare the Speaker’s ruling unconstitutional. Declare the bill invalid for bypassing Section 108. Order Parliament to restart the process.

Case 2 — APC Party (National Action)

Prayers: Declare the bill unconstitutional.

Declare the parliamentary process null and void. Prevent presidential assent. (Note: The president has not assented - submited bill to Supreme Court for opinion)

Case 3 — Conteh & Kelley (Civil Society).

Prayers: Declare that entrenched provisions cannot be amended by simple majority.

Clarify the amendment architecture.

Issue guidance on future constitutional amendments.

Case 4 — Speaker’s Reference (Status uncertain)

If filed, the Speaker would seek: Judicial confirmation that Section 91 applies and a

Validation of the parliamentary process.

However, it would sppear that despite the loud publicity, the Speaker's referal has not materilised. But the President has now referred the Bill to the Supreme Coyrt for interpretation under section 122 of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution.

Will the Supreme Court hear them individually or collectively?

Likely outcome: COLLECTIVE HEARING.

The Supreme Court will almost certainly:consolidate the cases, hear them together, issue one unified judgment.

Reason: all cases raise the same constitutional question i.e. Does Section 108 apply? judicial economy, consistency of reasoning, avoidance of conflicting rulings.

SECTION 4 — RULES OF INTERPRETATION AND THEIR APPLICATION.

Let us briegly examine the basic rules courts use to interpret statutes and constitutions. These rules help judges understand what Parliament meant and how laws should apply in real cases.

1. Literal Rule. Meaning of words as written.

The Literal Rule gives words their plain, ordinary meaning. It is simple and predictable, but sometimes leads to absurd results — like in Fisher v Bell case, where displaying a knife was not legally an “offer for sale” in contract law.

Attorney‑General v Momoh (Sierra Leone, 1974) — literal meaning governs unless it defeats the Constitution’s structure.

Applied to Sierra Leone's crisis:

The Constitution references death penalty → therefore it cannot be abolished without amending text.

Amendment bill touches entrenched provision, therefore Section 108 with referendum, should have applied.

2. Purposive Rule. This helps judges to Interpret legal provisions in light of their purpose and spirit. It is especially important for constitutional cases.

The Purpose of entrenchment is to protect foundational rights, prevent arbitrary amendment, require referendum.

The Purposive interpretation strengthens Section 108. In the case of Minister of Home Affairs v Fisher, the court said constitutions must be read generously. This rule is central to Sierra Leone’s current constitutional crisis.

Kallon v State (Sierra Leone, 2009) — Court stated that the Constitution must be interpreted holistically.

This Rule determines whether Parliament must follow Section 108’s referendum requirement.

3. Golden Rule. Avoid absurdity.

Absurd outcome: entrenched clauses amended by simple majority.

The Golden Rule starts with the literal meaning but allows judges to modify it to avoid absurdity.

In the landmark English constitutional and public law case which serves as a primary textbook example of the Golden Rule of Statutory interpretation, Adler v George,[1964] 2 QB 7, “in the vicinity of” was interpreted to include “in”, because excluding it would be ridiculous. The dramatic distinction of the Speaker Segepoh Solomon Thomas in the debate to remove the Auditor General - members "IN" Parliament as against mambers "OF" Parliament (still undecided) caused him to apply the simple majority - section 91 interpretation. (See adendom for this case).

4. Mischief Rule. Identify the mischief the law intended to prevent. Basically, the Mischief Rule asks what problem Parliament intended to fix. It comes from Heydon’s Case in 1584 in England. This rule is practical and focuses on legislative intent.

The Mischief is the arbitrary amendment of core constitutional provisions

There are three othe Contextual Rules which help judges to interpret lists, and phrases. These are:

Ejusdem Generis; general words limited to same type as specific words.

Expressio Unius: mention of one thing excludes others.

Noscitur a Sociis: words interpreted by surrounding words.

Application to Sierra Leone - Likely Supreme Court Approach.

The Supreme Court may choose to use The Purposive Rule: purposive interpretation (primaryly - and decide that section 108 must apply; so a 2/3rd majority (and/referandum) is reqiired).

On the other hand, the Supreme Court may use the Literal Rule and afirm the Speaker of Parliment's use of Section 91 - simple majority thereby effecting the literal interpretation (secondary), and/or the Court may make full use of comparative jurisprudence in supporting its decision.

SECTION 5 — COMPARATIVE CASE LAW

Kenya — Articles 255–257 require referendum for structural amendments.

In Ndii v Attorney General - Ordinary legislation cannot amend constitutional structure. Its Supreme Court emphasises public participation.

Ghana: Article 290 entrenches key provisions. Referendum required.Courts adopt purposive interpretation. In the case of Asare v Attorney General- Entrenched clauses require strict compliance.

Uganda.:Articles 260–262 require referendum.Courts strike down improperly passed amendments.

Zambia: Article 79 entrenches Bill of Rights. Referendum mandatory.

South Africa: Section 74 requires supermajority. Constitutional Court emphasises architecture. Certification of the Constitution - Amendment tiers must be respected.

Nigeria — Attorney General v Abubakar - Constitutional supremacy prevents amendment by implication.

India — Kesavananda Bharati - Basic structure cannot be altered by ordinary legislation.

Canada — Senate Reference - Constitutional architecture cannot be changed through ordinary statutes.

Kallon v State (Sierra Leone, 2009) — Constitution must be interpreted holistically.

Comparative Insight - Sierra Leone’s Section 108 aligns with regional practic and Purposive interpretation is the dominant judicial approach.

CONCLUSION

Sierra Leone stands at a constitutional crossroads. The crisis is structural, not episodic. The unresolved tension between Section 91 and Section 108 — exposed during the 2021 death penalty abolition — has now escalated into a full constitutional crisis. Treaty ratification strengthened abolition but did not cure domestic procedural shortcuts.

At its core lies a clash between Literal and Purposive interpretation, each producing radically different outcomes.

The Supreme Court’s ruling will determine the validity of the 2026 amendment bill, the limits of parliamentary power, the meaning of entrenched constitutional protections, and the proper pathway for constitutional reform in the future. It will also clarify the President’s 14‑day assent obligation.

Comparative jurisprudence strongly favours the Purposive approach, requiring strict amendment procedures and referendum safeguards.

The future of Sierra Leone’s constitutional stability depends on restoring amendment discipline. Whatever the Court decides, this moment will shape Sierra Leone’s constitutional trajectory for decades.

ADENDUM

Constitutional Entrenchment & Amendment Procedures:

1. What is the purpose of Entrenchment. Why do they exist?

Entrenched clauses exist to: Protect foundational constitutional principles from ordinary political change. They require higher thresholds (supermajorities, referenda, or both) and signals that certain provisions form the constitutional “core” or “identity”.

These clauses often cover: Separation of powers, Fundamental rights, Electoral systems, Territorial integrity, Presidential term limits (in African jurisdictions especially).

2. Two Global Models of Entrenchment.

Procedural Entrenchment uses explicit amendment thresholds (i.e., supermajorities, referenda, special legislative procedures).

Examples: Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Australia.

Substantive Entrenchment: Courts protect unwritten constitutional “basic structure” even without explicit entrenchment clauses.

Examples: India, partially South Africa, Canada (through federalism and rights architecture).

3. Role of Referenda

Referenda serve as: A democratic veto. against elite-driven constitutional change and It is a legitimacy mechanism for altering foundational clauses and a safeguard against unilateral parliamentary amendments. African constitutions (post‑1990s) frequently require referenda for entrenched clauses, reflecting 'Post-conflict' constitutional settlements, Desire to prevent 'authoritarian reversals' and Public participation norms.

4. Judicial Approaches to Entrenchment. Courts typically adopt one of three interpretive stances:

a. Purposive Interpretation

Courts read entrenchment clauses broadly to protect constitutional values.

Used in: Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Canada, Australia.

b. Basic Structure Doctrine

Courts strike down amendments that violate the constitution’s core identity, even if procedurally valid.

Used in: India (strongest version globally).

c. Undetermined / Emerging Doctrine

Courts have not yet clarified the scope of entrenched clauses.

Example: Sierra Leone, pending the 2026.

Supreme Court ruling on Section 108/Section 91 ongoing crisis.

5. Why Entrenchment Matters for Constitutional Stability.

Entrenchment affects: Amendment difficulty Executive overreach, Protection of term limits, Judicial review scope, Public trust in constitutional change,

Countries with strong entrenchment plus purposive courts, tend to have: More stable constitutional orders, Fewer unilateral amendments, Clearer separation of powers.

Those Countries with weak judicial enforcement or ambiguous doctrine face: Higher risk of political manipulation, Uncertainty in amendment validity, and Litigation over constitutional identity

6. Comparative Insight Before the Table

Most Commonwealth and African constitutions combine procedural entrenchment with purposive judicial interpretation, while India stands alone with a powerful substantive doctrine.

Sierra Leone is the only jurisdiction where the judicial approach remains unresolved pending the upcoming constitutional cases now before the Supreme Court.

Country	Entrenched Clauses?	Amendment Procedure	Referendum Required?	Judicial Approach
Sierra Leone	Yes (Section 108)	2/3 + referendum	Yes, for entrenched clauses	Undetermined (pending 2026 ruling)
Ghana	Yes (Art. 290)	2/3 + referendum	Yes	Purposive
Kenya	Yes (Arts. 255–257)	Parliament + referendum	Yes	Purposive
Uganda	Yes (Arts. 260–262)	Parliament + referendum	Yes	Purposive
Zambia	Yes (Art. 79)	Parliament + referendum	Yes	Purposive
South Africa	Yes (Sec. 74)	Supermajority	No	Purposive
India	Basic Structure Doctrine	Parliament + judicial review	No	Strong purposive
Canada	Yes (Constitution Act 1982)	7/50 or unanimity	No	Purposive
Australia	Yes	Parliament + referendum	Yes	Purposive
New Zealand	Limited entrenchment	Supermajority or referendum	Sometimes	Mixed

8 Adler v George [1964] 2 QB 7

by Cindy Wong

Key Point

Under the golden rule of statutory interpretation, where the literal rule of statutory interpretation renders an absurd or inconsistent result, the judge can substitute a reasonable meaning in the light of the statute as a whole.

Facts

Under s.3 Official Secrets Act 1920, it was an offence to obstruct a HM Forces ‘in the vicinity of a prohibited place’. The defendant had entered an RAF Station, a prohibited place under the Act, rather than ‘in the vicinity’ of it.

Issue

If the literal rule was applied, the defendant did not infringe the terms of the act as he was ‘in the area’ instead of ‘in the vicinity’ of the prohibited place.

Held (High Court, Queen’s Bench Division)

The defendant’s conviction was upheld under the golden rule.
The golden rule was applied to extend the meaning of s.3 – ‘in the vicinity’ must be construed as ‘in or in the vicinity of’.

Lord Parker CJ

‘It would be extraordinary, I venture to think it would be absurd, if an indictable offence was thereby created when the obstruction took place out- side the precincts of the station, albeit in the vicinity, and no offence at all was created if the obstruction occurred on the station itself.’

Comments.

https://www.facebook.com/share/19DQ3TJw6f/?mibextid=wwXIfr

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19UczHHjb9/?mibextid=wwXIfr

Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr (Author/Blogger/ Publisher (14/09/2026)

Monday, 21 September 2026

Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court Confronts a Constitutional Breakdown: Amendment Crisis - Ultra Vires Actions, Procedural Breaches, and Fate of the Amendment Bill.

Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court Confronts a Constitutional Breakdown: Amendment Crisis: Ultra Vires Actions, Procedural Breaches, and Fate of the Amendment Bill.

By Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr. 19/09 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Constitutional Fidelity on Trial: The Supreme Court’s Role in Sierra Leone’s Amendment Controversy.

Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court is now seized with five separate petitions challenging the legality of the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2025. These petitions—filed by the Speaker, the APC, two senior lawyers (Conteh and Kelley), and MP/Lawyer Osman Timbo—collectively allege procedural violations, constitutional breaches, and in one case, fraud in the Gazette publication process.

At the centre of the dispute is Section 108(2)(b) of the 1991 Constitution, which requires a two‑thirds majority (100 votes) for constitutional amendments. The bill reportedly passed with 96 votes, following a controversial ruling by the Speaker that individual clauses could be approved by a simple majority. This triggered walkouts, public outcry, and multiple legal challenges.

The petitions raise four core constitutional questions:

Did Parliament meet the mandatory two‑thirds threshold?
Was the Speaker’s procedural interpretation lawful?
Were the Gazette publications valid and authentic?
Did the President violate Section 106(7) by failing to assent within 14 days?

The most serious allegation comes from Osman Timbo, who claims the Attorney General oversaw a fraudulent second Gazette publication, rendering the entire amendment process void ab initio.

Regionally, similar constitutional crises have occurred in Kenya, Ghana, and Malawi, where courts have struck down amendments for procedural defects. Locally, Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court has historically adopted a strict constructionist approach to constitutional amendment procedures.

The Court is expected to consolidate hearings but issue separate determinations, especially regarding the alleged Gazette fraud.

The outcome will shape Sierra Leone’s constitutional order, electoral system, gender representation framework, and public trust in democratic institutions.

I. Introduction.

A Constitutional Moment of Reckoning

Sierra Leone stands at a pivotal constitutional moment, confronting one of the most consequential constitutional crises since the 1991 Constitution came into force. The Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act, 2025 — intended to reform electoral thresholds, entrench proportional representation, and introduce a 30% gender quota — has become the subject of unprecedented judicial scrutiny with five separate petitions before the Supreme Court.

These petitions challenge not only the vote count, Gazette publications, and Speaker’s procedural rulings, but also the President’s delayed assent and the Clerk’s handling of the bill. Together, they expose a multi‑layered breakdown in constitutional discipline.

On September 14, 2026, President Julius Maada Bio invoked Section 122(1) of the Constitution, referring the bill to the Supreme Court for an advisory opinion. This referral, combined with four additional petitions, has created the most complex constitutional litigation since the 1991 Constitution came into force.

II. The Five Petitions Before the Supreme Court

1. The Speaker’s Reference (Section 122 Opinion Request)

Nature: A request for the Supreme Court’s advisory opinion under Section 122(1). Core Issue: Speaker Segepoh Solomon Thomas seeks clarification on whether individual clauses of a constitutional amendment may pass by simple majority, even if the final bill requires a two‑thirds majority.

The key constitutional provision is Section 108(2)(b) — which requires “not less than two‑thirds of the Members of Parliament” for constitutional amendments.

Key Legal Questions that arise are: Does Section 108(2)(b) require two‑thirds of all MPs for each clause, or only for the final bill? Can the Speaker’s procedural interpretation override the plain meaning of the Constitution?

Prayer sought: Clarification of the correct voting threshold. Validation or invalidation of the Speaker’s ruling.

Likely Judicial Approach. The Court will apply the literal rule first: “Two‑thirds of the Members of Parliament” means 100 votes out of 149. The Speaker’s interpretation is likely to be tested against the purposive rule, which emphasises constitutional stability and supermajority safeguards.

Regional parallels: In Kenya (2010–2021), courts held that constitutional amendments require strict procedural compliance (BBI case). In Ghana (2019): Supreme Court invalidated an amendment attempt due to procedural defects.

2. The Nature of the APC Petition spells a direct challenge to the validity of the parliamentary vote.

Their core legal claim is that the bill was passed with 96 votes and not the constitutionally required 100. Therefore, the bill is void ab initio because the constitutional amendment procedure was not satisfied. This numerical failure to meet the supermajority threshold renders the bill invalid.

Legal Questions: Was the vote count properly recorded? Does a failure to meet the supermajority threshold automatically invalidate and void the bill? Can Parliament cure such a defect retrospectively?

Prayer. A Declaration that the bill failed to meet the constitutional threshold; and a Declaration that the bill is null and void.

Local precedent: Sierra Leone Supreme Court has historically enforced strict compliance in amendment procedures (e.g., State v. Attorney General, 1994).

Regional parallels: Malawi (2009): Constitutional Court struck down amendments passed without proper quorum.

Likely Judicial Approach. The Court will likely: (a) examine Hansard, (b) review the Parliamentary Clerk’s certification, and (c) consider whether procedural irregularities can be cured. Given the clarity of Section 108(2)(b), the APC petition is procedurally strong.

3. The Conteh & Kelley Petitions (Lawyers’ Society members)

These are individual petitions filed separately, but they arise from the same professional concerns: constitutional compliance/rule of law and procedural integrity. T

Thomas M. Conteh’s Petition focuses on: Procedural defects in the legislative process; challenges to procedural irregularities; the Speaker’s interpretation and the need for strict compliance with amendment procedures.

Kelley’s Petition emphasises: Rule‑of‑law implications, Public trust, constitutional discipline, and the danger of setting a precedent where constitutional amendments are passed without proper supermajority safeguards.

Legal Questions Raised by these two lawyers are: whether procedural irregularities undermine the legitimacy of constitutional amendments. and whether the Court should adopt a strict constructionist approach to amendment procedures.

Prayers: Declaration that the amendment process was constitutionally defective and Orders reinforcing strict procedural compliance for future amendments.

Local jurisprudence: Sierra Leone courts have consistently held that constitutional amendments must follow strict procedural safeguards (e.g., Charles Margai v. AG, 2005).

4. The Osman Timbo Petition (MP & Lawyer)

This is the most explosive of the petitions because it alleges criminal misconduct by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice Alpha Sesay.

Core Allegation: Timbo alleges that the second Gazette publication—required under Section 108(2)—was fraudulent.

He claims that the first Gazette publication was valid. The second publication, required under Section 108(2), was not properly done. Instead, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Alpha Sesay, Esq., allegedly oversaw a forged publication of a document purporting to be the second publication. The bill was illegally tabled in parliament, and therefore void ab initio.

Legal Consequence Claimed. If true, the entire amendment process is void ab initio, because a constitutional amendment cannot be tabled without two valid Gazette publications.

A forged Gazette publication would constitute: Fraud, Abuse of office, Violation of constitutional procedure, and Contamination of the legislative process. The Court should order a forensic audit of Gazette logs and printing records.

Legal Questions raised: Was the second Gazette publication authentic? Was it published in accordance with the Government Printing Department’s statutory procedures? Does alleged fraud by the Attorney General invalidate the entire process?

Prayer being sought: A Declaration that the bill was illegally tabled in Parliament; a Declaration that the bill is void ab initio; and a Referral of the matter for criminal investigation.

Lawyer Timbo explains: Click link.

https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1EKywRoo4V/?mibextid=wwXIfr

Likely Judicial Approach - The Court will likely: Demand the original Gazette logs, examine printing records, compare serial numbers, and possibly order a forensic audit of the publication trail. If fraud is proven, the Court has no discretion: The bill becomes void ab initio, and the Attorney General may face criminal investigation.

Regional parallels: Uganda (2018): Constitutional Court invalidated amendments due to procedural fraud and irregularities.

III. Will the Supreme Court Hear the Case Individually or Collectively?

All four petitions raise procedural‑legality challenges to the Constitutional Amendment Bill 2025. Although their factual bases differ, they converge on one question: Was the constitutional amendment process conducted in a manner consistent with Sections 106–108 of the 1991 Constitution?

The Supreme Court is therefore likely to treat them as related questions of constitutional procedure, but the prayers sought differ enough that the Court may adopt a consolidated hearing with separate determinations. They may apply one of two options: (a) Consolidate the Hearings because all petitions concern the same bill, the same constitutional provisions, and the same procedural defects. This guarantees efficiency and consistency. (b) Separate Determinations: Even if heard together, the Court may issue separate rulings because the prayers differ, the legal bases differ, and the Timbo allegation involves potential criminality, which must be treated distinctly.

IV. The Speaker’s Ultra Vires Invocation of Section 122 - A Further Examination.

A central defect in the amendment process is the Speaker’s attempt to invoke Section 122 — a constitutional provision that grants no authority whatsoever to the Speaker of Parliament.

1. Section 122 Is Explicit and Exhaustive. Only two offices may refer questions of law to the Supreme Court: The President under Section 122(1) and the Attorney General under Section 122(2). No other actor is mentioned or implied.

2. The Speaker Is Constitutionally Excluded. By attempting to refer a question under Section 122, the Speaker assumed a power the Constitution does not grant him. He also attempted to bypass the Executive and sought judicial validation for his own procedural rulings. He also violated the doctrine of separation of powers and acted ultra vires the Constitution. He cannot “borrow” or “assume” powers simply because he disagrees with parliamentary procedure or anticipates litigation. This is not a grey area but a bright‑line constitutional prohibition.

3. Under the Canon of Interpretation - Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, the Constitution’s express mention of the President and Attorney General excludes all others.

4. The Purposive Rule of Interpretation Confirms the Exclusion: Section 122 is designed to prevent constitutional crises, allow the Executive to seek clarification on constitutional questions, and avoid judicial entanglement in parliamentary disputes and avoid the politicisation of judicial advisory opinions.

It maintains separation of powers by ensuring Parliament does not use the Court to validate its own internal procedures. Allowing the Speaker to invoke Section 122 would distort the constitutional architecture by referring any procedural dispute to the Court, bypassing the Executive. He could use the Court to validate controversial rulings and transform the Supreme Court into a parliamentary dispute‑resolution body.

5. The Speaker’s Action Amounts to a Functional Constitutional Amendment Without Authority.

While the Speaker has not formally amended the Constitution, his conduct and actions effectively and functionally attempted to expand powers not granted by the Constitution. This would create a new constitutional practice by fiat; reinterpret Section 122 to include himself; Alter the balance of powers between Parliament and the Executive; and introduce a new constitutional mechanism without amendment.

This action by the Speaker, Segepoh Solomon Thomas, is a constitutionally impermissible travesty. Only a constitutional amendment under Section 108 can expand the Speaker’s powers and even then, only with: Two Gazette publications; a two-thirds supermajority (currently 100 votes); and Presidential assent. The Speaker cannot achieve this through unilateral action.

6. Regional Jurisprudence Supports the Ultra Vires Finding. Across Africa, courts consistently reject institutional self‑expansion.

Courts in Kenya (BBI Case, 2021) - Courts struck down attempts by parliamentary actors to exercise powers not granted by the Constitution. In Ghana (2019 Amendment Challenge) - Supreme Court invalidated procedural innovations not grounded in constitutional text. In Uganda (2018 Age‑Limit Case), the Court held that parliamentary actors cannot assume powers not expressly granted, and also in Malawi, courts consistently reject institutional self‑expansion of the Constitution.

7. Ethical Dimension - The Speaker’s action reflects a deeper ethical problem: Constitutional power is a public trust, and not a personal entitlement!

Section 106(7) of the 1991 Constitution states that when a bill is presented to the President.

V. The Presidential Assent Problem: Section 106(7) - Non‑Obvious Insight.

“The President shall signify his assent or otherwise within fourteen days of the presentation of the Bill.”

If the President does not assent within 14 days, the Constitution requires the bill to be returned to Parliament. The President’s delay in signing the bill (now beyond 14 days - The President received it 31 days after 10th August 2026) interacts directly with these petitions. If the Court rules that the bill was not validly passed, then the President’s failure to sign becomes legally irrelevant. If the Court rules that the bill was validly passed, then the President’s delay becomes constitutionally problematic: delay violates Section 106(7), which requires assent within 14 days. This creates a constitutional tension that the Court may need to resolve explicitly. Sierra Leone courts have held that constitutional timelines are mandatory, not discretionary.

This will also affect the remedies the Court may consider. If the Court finds the bill valid, it must address whether the President can still sign it after the 14‑day window or whether the bill must be returned to Parliament. If the Court finds the bill invalid, the President’s delay becomes moot. The bill collapses under Section 108 procedural defects

VI. The 14‑Day Rule Under Section 106(7)

1. What does Section 106(7) actually say?

“The President shall signify his assent or otherwise within fourteen days of the presentation of the Bill.”

Key phrase: “presentation of the Bill” - Not: “passing of the Bill”; “gazetting of the Bill”; “transmission by the Clerk”; “tabling by Parliament”. The Constitution is explicit.

2. When does “presentation” occur?

Presentation = physical or formal delivery to the President.

This is normally done by the Clerk of Parliament, through the Office of the Speaker, via the Cabinet Secretariat. Therefore: The 14‑day clock begins the moment the President receives the bill.

3. Can the Parliamentary Clerk delay presentation? The Answer is "No"!

The Clerk of Parliament has no constitutional discretion to delay. The Clerk is a Civil servant and an administrative officer, not a constitutional actor.

A 31‑day delay is unconstitutional because it undermines Section 106(7). It interferes with the President’s constitutional duty. It alters the amendment timeline. It creates a loophole where Parliament can manipulate assent deadlines. It violates the principle of constitutional certainty. We saw a similar occurrence when the Cyber Crime Act was passed in 2021.

Legal consequence:

The Clerk’s delay may itself be a procedural defect that: Contaminates the amendment process; Strengthens the APC and Lawyers’ petitions; and supports Timbo’s argument that the process was void ab initio.

VII. Likely Supreme Court Approach.

Concise Takeaway

All four petitions raise procedural‑legality challenges to the Amendment Bill. Although their factual bases differ, they converge on one question: Was the constitutional amendment process conducted in a manner consistent with Sections 106–108 of the 1991 Constitution? The Supreme Court is therefore likely to treat them as related questions of constitutional procedure, but the prayers differ enough that the Court may adopt a consolidated hearing with separate determinations.

1. Consolidated Hearing. The Court will likely consolidate the petitions due to overlapping issues.

2. Separate Determinations. Distinct rulings are expected for the Speaker’s interpretation; The APC vote‑count challenge; The Gazette fraud allegation; and the presidential assent delay.

3. Strict Constructionist Interpretation. Based on Sierra Leone’s jurisprudence and regional trends, the Court is likely to adopt a strict interpretation of amendment procedures.

VIII. Implications for Governance and Public Trust

The Court’s ruling will determine whether proportional representation becomes permanent; whether the presidential threshold changes to 50% + 1; whether the 30% gender quota becomes law; whether the Attorney General faces investigation; and whether Parliament must restart the amendment process. This case will shape Sierra Leone’s constitutional future for decades.

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1Bt3Gdr7Pd/?mibextid=wwXIfr

IX. CONCLUSION

Constitutional Fidelity as an Ethical Imperative

Sierra Leone now stands at a constitutional crossroads. The controversies surrounding the Amendment Bill are not merely technical disputes over vote counts, Gazette publications, or procedural timelines. They strike at the heart of ethical governance, public trust, and the moral foundations of constitutional democracy.

A Constitution is not simply a legal instrument; it is a social covenant. It binds leaders to restraint, institutions to integrity, and citizens to a shared belief that power is exercised within known, predictable, and lawful boundaries. When constitutional procedures are bent, bypassed, or creatively reinterpreted, the damage is not only legal — it is ethical. It erodes institutions' moral authority and weakens the public’s faith in the fairness of the democratic process.

The Speaker’s ultra vires invocation of Section 122, the Clerk’s unconstitutional delay in presenting the bill, the disputed vote count, and the grave allegation of Gazette fraud collectively reveal a deeper problem: a culture of procedural improvisation that risks normalising constitutional shortcuts. Such shortcuts may appear expedient in the moment, but they corrode the ethical discipline required to sustain democratic legitimacy.

The Supreme Court now carries a solemn responsibility. Its ruling must not only clarify the law — it must reaffirm the ethical duty of all constitutional actors to uphold the letter and spirit of the Constitution. A democracy survives not because its laws are perfect, but because its leaders and institutions choose to obey them faithfully.

Whatever the Court decides, this moment should serve as a national reminder: Constitutional power is a trust, not a possession. Its exercise demands humility, restraint, and unwavering fidelity to due process. Only through such ethical discipline can Sierra Leone strengthen its democratic foundations and preserve the integrity of its constitutional order for generations to come.