Justice on the Dock: Temperament, Recusal, and the Constitutional Crisis in Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court

 Justice on the Dock: Temperament, Recusal, and the Constitutional Crisis in Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court.

By Israel Ojekeh Parper Snr.  09/10/2026

When the Constitution of a nation is on the operating table, the courtroom cannot afford to become a battleground of personalities. The constitutional crisis currently unfolding before Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court—centered on the controversial passage of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill—has tested not only the limits of legislative power, but also the delicate boundaries of judicial temperament and courtroom decorum.  

Following a dramatic confrontation that saw senior counsel Joseph Fitzgerald Kamara (J.F.K.) ordered to step into the dock after accusing the Bench of "showing its hand too early," and later, remanded at Pademba Road Prison: public attention sharply shifted from the legal merits of the case to the impartiality of the court itself. At stake was a fundamental question of democratic integrity: Can a judiciary where sitting judges were appointed under the current administration deliver an unassailable verdict on the rules governing the country’s democracy?

1. The Core Legal Battle: Section 91 (1) vs. Section 108 2 (b).

The substantive debate before the Supreme Court turned on a sharp conflict over legislative procedure and voting thresholds regarding how the 1991 Constitution may be altered.

 The State’s Position (Section 91(1)): 

The State argues that for non-entrenched provisions of the Constitution, ordinary parliamentary rules apply. Under Section 91(1), decisions are determined by a simple majority of "Members present and voting." 

In this view, when opposition members execute a parliamentary walkout, the voting threshold drops accordingly—allowing a simple majority of those remaining in the chamber to pass the amendment bill into law.

The Opposition’s Position (Section 108(2)(b):

Senior counsel and opposition advocates argue that any alteration to the supreme law of the land—whether entrenched or non-entrenched— is strictly governed by Section 108. Section 108(2)(b) explicitly mandates a two-thirds supermajority of "all Members of Parliament," not merely those present in their seats. 

They contend that Section 91 is a residual clause meant for ordinary statutes and must step aside when constitutional amendments are on the floor. 

2. Judicial Temperament and the Power of Contempt.      

The friction in court escalated when counsel raised procedural objections regarding the State's failure to file mandatory legal papers on time. When the Chief Justice intervened in a manner that appeared to defend or excuse the Attorney General's omission, counsel remarked that the court had "showed its hand too early."

The Chief Justice admonished counsel to "mind your language; this is not a political theatre," prompting counsel to reply that he was merely citing provisions of the law and asking to be allowed to make his case. The court adjourned, only for the bench to return the following day demanding a formal apology. 

Deeming the tendered apology insufficient, the Chief Justice ordered counsel to remove his wig and enter the dock before being taken down by security to Pademba Road Prison (or Male Correctional Centre).

THE DYNAMICS OF COURT DECORUM rests on two levels:

ZELOUS ADVOCACY

> Firm procedural obligation

> Challenging State non- compliance 

>Protecting client’s rights. 

JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS

> Patience under provocation 

>Summary contempt of last resort

> Preserving public confidence 

This escalation highlights critical principles of judicial administration:

 Proportionality: Summary contempt is intended as a weapon of last resort to prevent actual disruption of proceedings, not to punish verbal exchanges or vindicate personal pride.

The Danger of Punitive Sanctions: Ordering a former Attorney General and senior advocate into the dock and imprisoning him after an apology (and retraction) is entered on the record, risks creating the perception that personal authority, rather than the administration of justice, is driving the court's actions.

3. Recusal Procedure in the Supreme Court.

When a litigant or counsel believes a judge cannot hear a case impartially, the law provides a formal mechanism for recusal grounded in the principles of natural justice—specifically nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a judge in their own cause).

Grounds for Recusal.

1. Apparent Bias: Under the established common law standard (Porter v Magill), a applicant does not need to prove actual bias. The test is whether a "reasonable and fair-minded observer" would conclude there is a real possibility the judge is biased.

2. Hostility In Court (In Facie Curiae):

A heated personal clash where a judge threatens summary contempt, rejects a formal apology, orders counsel to “remove his wig and go into the dock and afterwards orders his arrest in open court,  then instructs security to “take him down” to prison, creates an objective perception of animus.

3. Prejudgment & Double Standards:

Excusing or shielding a defaulting party from statutory procedural requirements gives the appearance of favoring one side before full arguments are heard.

The Procedural Steps for Recusal

1)>Notice of motion (Affidavit of apparent bias)

2)> Panel heating(Arguments on impartiality)

3)>Judicial decision (Voluntary step-down or written refusal)

4)> Reconstruction (Empanel neutral panel . 

1. Notice of Motion: Counsel files a formal application supported by an affidavit detailing the specific facts, statements, and actions showing apparent bias or personal conflict.

2. Hearing Before the Panel: The application is brought directly before the presiding judge or the entire bench, where arguments on judicial impartiality are formally entered into the record.

3. Judicial Discretion or Voluntary Step-Down: The judge can either voluntarily step aside to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice or refuse the motion with written reasons.

4. Reconstitution of the Bench: If the Chief Justice recuses himself from presiding, administrative authority allows the panel to be reconstituted. A full bench of seven Supreme Court Justices can be empaneled—ideally including senior, non-conflicted jurists—to ensure the eventual ruling commands full public legitimacy.

Conclusion.

The power of the judiciary ultimately rests on public trust, not physical force. When judicial officers clash with senior advocates over procedural objections, the boundary between enforcing decorum and shielding the State becomes dangerously blurred.

For Chief Justice Komba Kamanda, stepping aside from presiding over this specific case would not be a concession of defeat, but an act of judicial restraint. In a constitutional contest where ALL FIVE sitting judge on the bench were  appointed under the current administration, self-recusal offers the cleanest path to ensure that whatever verdict the Supreme Court reaches on Sections 91 and 108, it is accepted as the definitive voice of the law, rather than the political triumph of one faction over another.

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Sierra Leone’s Supreme Court Confronts a Constitutional Breakdown:  Amendment Crisis - Ultra Vires Actions, Procedural Breaches, and Fate of the Amendment Bill.

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